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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ANGELO RA VARINO,

\

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
vs.

\

HARRY PRICE, JR., and MRS. HARRY
PRICE JR., his wife, and MRS. MARCUS PARR, also known as ARLINDA PRICE PARR,

(
)

Civil No. 7882

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

· INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
The basic problem in this case is a question of law, viz:
Under the facts and circumstances of this case is the defendant
Harry Price estopped in equity to assert the defense of the
statute of frauds?
The defendants Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus Parr
both signed an earnest money receipt for the sale of certain
5
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.............

property in Salt Lake City to plaintiff. Defendant Harry Price
having signed a listing contract, then orally agreed to complete the said written contract so signed by his wife and sister,
Defendant Harry Price was told by plaintiff that he wanted
to buy trackage for access to said property, but would buy only
if Price definitely was going to sell to plaintiff, and on Price's
assurance that he would sell, that there was a deal, and for
plaintiff to buy the trackage, plaintiff, in reliance thereon
bought a strip of land 19 x 60 feet adjoining the land in
question for the sum of $1796.00. The real problem is whether
the doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable as against the
statute of frauds in the defense of Harry Price.
The defendants and appellants have not directly contested any single finding of fact or conclusion of law of the
Trial Court, nor have they asserted that any finding of fact
is not amply supported by the record in the case. Instead,
appellants have recited in considerable detail portions of the
testimony and evidence in the action. They recite the facts
as they would have liked the Trial Court to find them rather
than as they were found by the Trial Judge. They request that
the Court consider all of the evidence de novo.
We agree that this Coutt will re-examine the evidence
in cases of equity. However, where there is a conflict in the
testimony and the findings of fact are amply supported by the
evidence, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that this Court
will not upset those findings. In the case at bar the Findings
of Fact are not only supported by the evidence, but the Trial
Court reasonably could not have made any other findings. For
this reason the statement of facts of defendants and appellants
6
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cannot be accepted. Reference will be made in the Statement
of Facts to the issues of fact before the Court below and the
findings made upon them by that Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 10, 1952, defendant Harry Price signed
an exclusive sales agency contract authorizing one Lewis Hansen, a real estate broker in Salt Lake Gty, to list for sale the
property located at "225-235 West 5th South," the size of
the property being indicated as "165 x 165" (Exhibit D; R.
76). Approximately two weeks after the signing of this
agreement, Mr. Hansen told Mr. Price that he had a signed offer
for $18,000.00 for the property (R. 77). Mr. Price told Mr.
Hansen that he would come in after work and sign the earnest
money receipt on which the offer appeared, but he failed to
come. The next day he told Mr. Hansen that his wife "wouldn't
sign" and Hansen would "have to get hold of her, she really
runs that end of it" (R~ 77). Price told Hansen that "as long
as she signed he would be willing to go along" (R. 82) .
It appears that during July and August the Prices were
shown several pieces of income property in Salt Lake City by
Mr. Hansen. Their attention centered on a piece of property
owned by Mr. A. C. Mollerup in Salt Lake City. Arrangements were made for their inspection of the Mollerup property
and a series of negotiations ensued between Mr. Rich, a real
estate broker who was acting for the Mollerups, and Mr.
Hansen, acting for the defendants, relating to the possibility
of an arrangement whereby defendants would purchase the
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Mollerup property with the money obtained from the sale
of their property. The Prices had an appraisal made of the
Mollerup property by a Mr. Schluter. In response to a telephone call. from Mrs. Price, Hansen went to her office and
discussed the transaction (R. 80).
Exhibits E and J were discussed and signed at the same
time by Mrs. Price at a coffee shop below Mrs. Price's office.
"Exhibit E," the agreement sued upon in this cause, is an
earnest money receipt dated September 21, 1950, signed by
Mrs. Harry Price arrd Mrs. Marcus Parr, as sellers, and Angelo
Ravarino, as purchaser. It describes property "165 x 165 at 235
West 5th South." "Exhibit J" is an earnest money receipt
agreement signed by Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus Parr,
as purchasers, and A. C. Mollerup, as seller. It describes certain property as "243-245-247-249 West 4th South (93% ·
feet by 206 feet and right of way, inc. acreage on Pleasant
Court.)''
Mrs. Parr signed these exhibits the next day at noon in
Mr. Hansen's office (R. 84). At the time "Exhibit J" was
signed, the blank with respect to the interest on the unpaid
balance of the purchase price was left blank because they did
not know what interest rate was applicable. There was no
issue as to the question, but the interest rate was to be obtained
. from Mr. Rich and it was to be in the same amount "the rrio;t:
gage had on it" (R. 135).
Hansen called Mr. Price on the telephone September
21st, after Mrs. Price had signed Exhibits E and J, and before
Mrs. Parr had signed them.· Hansen told Mr. Price in that
conversation that his wife had signed and that his sister would
8
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be in to sign the next day. The terms contained in the exhibits
\Yere explained in detail to Mr. Price in this conversation.
J\Ir. Price replied that "he was willing to go along;" in fact,
"he was perfectly fine about it, he seemed anxious (R. 82-83).
Hansen told Price either in that conversation or in one the
next day that the deal "was all signed up," and he asked
Price "where we could get the abstracts." He was told that
Ted Cannon had them. Hansen said that he would get them
and have them brought up to date and examined and Price
agreed (R. 84) .
The two abstracts on the Price property were submitted to
Edward M. Morrissey, an attorney representing plaintiff Angelo
Ravarino, and the abstract on the Mollerup property was submitted to Mr. Ed Jensen, representing defendants (R. 84, 85).
Exhibits L and P are title opinions which resulted from these
examinations.
Within three or four days after the signing of the agreement by the two women, Hansen called Price and told him
that Mr. Ravarino wanted to obtain some trackage owned by
Mr. Roy Terry adjacent to defendants' property. Hansen told
Price that he did not want Ravarino to buy a "goat farm"
and that the 19-foot strip would certainly be of no interest
to Ravarino unless he was to get defendant's property. Hansen's version of the conversation was, "Now, it looks like
everything is O.K. and I just want to be sure there won't be
any backing out, because I don't want to .close the deal on the
Terry property. * * * I told him we were ready to close that
now and I wanted to be sure there wouldn't be any trouble.
* * * I said, 'If there is no objection I will go ahead and close
9
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it.' He said: 'That's fine, go ahead.' I said: I want to be sure
because if Ravarino has that it will be like a goat farm because he won't have any right of way to it.' So he assured me
it was all right and we closed it right close to that date, I think
October 5th was when we made the deal" (R. 87, 88).
Angelo Ravarino obtained the Terry trackage and gave
Hansen a check for $19,000 for defendants' property on the
same day, October 5th (R. 88; Exhibit N).
After the conversation between Price and Hansen regarding the Terry property there is no question but that everyone
. concerned believed that they had a deal; in fact, according to
Mr. Rich, defendants took possession of the Mollerup property
on October 1 and Harry Price was to sign up for the utilities
on that date (R. 145). Between October 1st and October 11th
Mr. Hansen notified Mr. Rich that Mr. Price had a question
about the income tax feature of the property (R. 144). Mr.
Rich then called a Mr. Wise of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and asked whether if there was a trade property there would
be an income tax to defendants. The transaction was explained
as a "hypothetical question" (R. 144). Up until that conversation there was no different transaction than contained in
Exhibits E and J (R. 144, 145 ).
Mr. Rich then prepared Exhibits 0, H and F and these
documents were submitted by Mr. Ed Jensen (R. 146). These
documents were prepared in their present form for the convenience of defendants in this action and so that there might
be a possible saving to them for income tax purposes (R. 101).
Mr. Rich called Harry Price during this period of time and
told him that Mollerup had ordered some merchandise on
10
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the strength of getting the money, and that he would lose his
cash discount if the money was not paid. He said he would
need $5000.00. Harry Price told Rich to get the money from
Hansen. Harry told Rich in this conversation that "the papers
will be signed as soon as the wife gets back from Denver"
(R. 148, 149).
On October 5th the closing documents were presented
to Mr. Price for his signature. He stated that everything was
all right but he wanted to go down to the county clerk's office
and determine the value of the property as it was given at the
time it was appraised in his father's estate and check some income tax questions, and that he would sign on the following
Monday (R. 149, 150). There was no question raised in these
conversations as to interest or payments or down payment,
because "that was all understood" (R. 150). Subsequently,
Mr. Hansen called Mr. Price dozens of times and Mr. Price
at all times indicated that he intended to complete the deal
but that he would be out of town for a day or two and that
he could not come in at that particular time (R. 94, 95, 96).
Finally, Ed Jensen told Hansen that his client was "drag-·
ging his feet" (R. 126). In November Price came in to see
Hansen and told him that his property was "hot'"' and that he
was not going through with the deal (R. 95) .
On November 14, 1950, the same day that this lawsuit
was filed, Mr. A. C. Mollerup addressed a letter entitled "Notice
and Demand" to Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr (Ex. 1). The notice
stated in substance that unless the transaction was completed
before November 20th, Mr. Mollerup would consider himself released and would pursue whatever remedies were available.
11
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On November 18, 1950, Mr. Ed Jensen, representing Mrs.
Price and Mrs. Parr, wrote to Mr. Mollerup and in effect
demanded performance of the Mollerup contract in behalf of
these persons, without interest on the $17,000 balance (Ex. I).
There is no indication in Exhibit I that either Mrs. Price or
Mrs. Parr are not bound by the transaction, or that they were
bound only conditionally upon the acceptance of the deal by
Harry Price; in fact, the tender in the le.tter and the demand
was unconditional. Harry Price was still looking into the
Mollerup property after the present lawsuit was filed in December.
The principal factual issues before the Trial Court were
as follows:

( 1) Were the signatures of .2\1rs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon
Exhibit E conditional? The defendants claimed at the trial
that Hansen told them Exhibit E would not be binding until
Harry Price signed it. Hansen denied this, and the Court found
specifically that it was not signed conditionally. (Finding
of Fact No.6; R. 251, 252).
2. Was Exhibit E filled m, t.e. were the blanks filled
in when it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr? The Court
specifically found on this question that it was filled in, as contended by plaintiff and as testified to by Hansen. (Finding of
Fact No. 6; R. 252).

3'. Did Ravarino purchase the Terry strip in reliance on
an oral promise of Harry Price that he would conclttde the
transaction? The Trial Court specifically found in Findings

12
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of Fact Nos. 6 and 10 that Price did in fact make such a representation and that Ravarino did in fact rely upon it.

4. Did the parties intend that all of defendants' property
on Fifth South was to be included in the sale to plaintiff? The
Trial Court specifically found that all of the property was
included in the transaction (R. 250-251); in fact, it appears
that at the time of defendants' first answer they themselves
had no question that the entire lot 165 x 165 was to be conveyed. The breaking down of the property into two separate
parcels appears to have been an afterthought, suggested by
counsel after it appeared that there were separate abstracts.
(See Par. 5 of defendants' first answer, R. 6).
The primary question of law, therefore, became simply
whether defendant Price was estopped in equity from asserting
the statute of frauds as a defense in view of plaintiff's purchase of the Terry strip in reliance on Price's acts and assurances, combined with all other facts including the signatures
of the two women and circumstances indicating that the parties all thought they had completed the transaction. The
Trial Court decided this question of law in plaintiff's favor.
The record shows that the complaint in this action was
filed on November 14, 1950. The answer was filed February
9, 1951. A few days before the trial, to-wit: May 22, 1951,
the defendants answered that they still denied that they were
liable to plaintiff in any way, but "if plaintiff has been aggrieved or injured by purchase of said (Terry) strip, the defendants herein are ready, willing and able to and hereby offer
to pay plaintiff the purchase price which he paid to the former
owners of said strip therefor upon plaintiff conveying to de-
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fendant Harry Price, Jr., and defendant Mrs. Marcus Parr a
good and marketable title thereto." Defendants now allege
that they have made a sufficient tender so that they' do not
have to perform their bargain. We think that the facts with
respect to this tender speak for themselves. It will, of course,
be argued further in this brief.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
, FACTUAL ISSUES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

(a) The signatures of Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon
Exhibit E," and their assent to the proposition therein contained, were not conditional upon the signatures or assent of
Harry Price.
11

11

(b) The purchase money receipt identified as Exhibit E"
was filled in and in its present form except for the signature
of Ravarino at the time it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mt's.
Parr.
(c) Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance upon
Harry Price's promise to complete the transaction.

(d) Both of the lots of defendants on Fifth South were
included in the transaction.

(e) The rule that the findings of the Trial Court on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal is applicable
in this case.
14
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POINT NO. II
EXHIBIT E WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.

POINT NO. III
DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE IS ESTOPPED IN
EQUITY TO DENY HIS PROMISE AND AGREEMENT
TO BE BOUND PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF EXHIBIT E.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO.1·
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
FACTUAL ISSUES ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
There were a number of important and basic factual questions presented or the determination of the Trial Court. As
heretofore Stated in this brief, appellants have not contended
and apparently do not now contend that the findings of the
Trial Court are not without support in the evidence. Appellants do not directly challenge a single Finding of Fact or
Conclusion of Law. Nevertheless, they purport to reargue
all of the evidence as though this Court was to disregard all
of the findings of the Trial judge. Appellants argue isolated
bits of evidence which, considered individually, tend to confuse the issues before the Trial Court, and certainly tend to
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unfairly present the issues before the Court on this appeal.
Appellants could not, we submit, contend directly in view of
all the evidence in this case that the Findings of Fact are not
supported.
Respondent most vigorously asserts that even in equity1
if the Findings of Fact of the trial judge are supported by the
evidence as they are in this case, those Findings will not be
upset on appeal. We desire in this portion of the argument
to point out to the Court the basic questions of fact involved
in this case, and to invite the Court's attention to the evidence
which supported each and all of those Findings.

(a) The signatures of Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price upon
rr Exhibit

E/' and their assent to the proposition therein contained, were not conditional upon the signatures or assent of

1-Iarry Price.
From the beginning of the negotiations the defendant
Price made it clear to Mr. Hansen that when the approval
of Mrs. Price was obtained to the transaction, the others would
be agreeable. After the earnest money receipt was signed by
Mr. Ravarino offering $18,000 in cash for defendants' property, Mr. Price came into Hansen's office and said, "My wife
won't sign it." Hansen said, "Well, you told q1e there would
be a sale, you didn't mention your wife, you mentioned your
sister having to sign it and it would be allright." Whereupon
Price said, "You will have to get hold of her, she really runs
that end of it." So Hansen testified that he called Mrs. Price
"that very day." Hansen told us that "she wouldn't, under
any circumstances, sell that property for $18,000 and turn the
$18,000 over to Harry. She said: "We will sell it but we want

16
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it to go in income property. If Harry has that money we don't
know what will happen to it" (R. 77).
It is submitted tha~ these are not the statements of a,
woman who did not intend to be bound until her husband
approved the deal. It is clear that Mrs. Price was the controlling
influence in all of the business transactions relating to the
property. The property, of course, belonged to Mr. Price
and Mrs. Parr, but Mrs. Price managed the property, handled
the income, drew the checks and she drew the check
from the account concerning this property to give to Hansen
as a deposit when Exhibit J was signed (R. 53, 163).
After the first offer of Ravarino was declined, the primary
dealings were with Mrs. Price. She was shown the Mollerup
property by Mr. Rich, and the testimony is that Hansen showed
various properties in Salt Lake City to her and Mrs. Parr. Mrs.
Price arranged for Mr. Schluter to appraise defendants' property and the Mollerup property (R. 51, 165, 166).
It was only natural and logical that the conversation on
September 21, 1950, which resulted in the signatures on Exhibits E and J, should be held with Mrs. Price. The evidence
is that these exhibits were prepared in a coffee shop below
Mrs. Price's place of employment. At that time Mrs. Price
related that Mr. Schluter thought the Price property was
maybe a little low, and as a result Mr. Hansen filled out Exhibit E to raise the amount on the Price property of $1000 and
the Mollerup property was reduced from $36,000 to $35,000,
"and so we made them both out right there and she signed them
both and she gave me a check for $500.00, which was to
~-.

'-'
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apply on the Mollerup property, and said her sister would be
in the next day at noon and sign it" (R. 80).
Mr. Hansen denied that he ever told Mrs. Price that these
documents would not be legal until Harry Price had signed
them (R. 114). When Mrs. Parr came in the next day at noon,
she signed Exhibits E and J without any question, and Mr.
Hansen denied making any representations whatsoever to her
(R. 82). Mrs. Price was not concerned about her husband's
consent. She stated on cross-examination that she signed the
exhibits without consulting him. There was no question about
securing his approval of the transaction. The fact is, of
course, that he approved of it, and that the whole thing was
explained to him by telephone the same day that Mrs. Price
signed the exhibits (R. 83, 84).
When Mr. A. C. Mollerup served the Notice and Demand
(Ex. 1) upon Mrs. Harry Price, Mrs. Marcus Parr and Hansen
Realty Company, demanding performance of the earnest money
receipt and agreement that was introduced into this case as
"Exhibit]," the women did not at that time consider that they
were not bound because the signature of Harry Price was not
obtained. This notice was served on or about November 14,
1950, on the same day that the complaint was filed in this
action. Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr then went to see Ed Jensen,
an attorney, and Mr. Price did not even attend the conference
with them (R. 216, 217). There was no demand made for
Mr. Price. Mr. Price was not in the conference and at that
time the two women were in fact attempting to assert some
rights in Exhibit J without any signature of Mr. Price being
affixed to it (R. 217).
18
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On November 18, 1950, Mr. Ed Jensen directed a letter
to Mr. A. C. Mollerup, which letter was introduced in this
action as "Exhibit I" as a result of the conferences with Mrs.
Price and Mrs. Parr with respect to the notice introduced
here as Exhibit 1. The last paragraph of Exhibit I commences
with the language, "Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr demand that
you sell the property above specified to them upon the terms
and conditions set forth in the earnest money receipt. * * *"
There apparently was no thought at this time that the signatures of these document~ were conditional in any way. In
fact, Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr are attempting to assert liability against Mollerup on the basis that Exhibit I ts complete in itself.
Even after this action was filed it does not appear that
any of the defendants thought of the consent of Mrs. Price and
Mrs. Parr and their signatures as being conditional. In Paragraph 5 of the first answer defendants filed on or about February 9, 1951~ defendants Mrs. Harry Price and Mrs. Marcus
Parr admitted that they executed the agreement. They did
not at that time assert any defense to the fact that they signed
only conditionally upon the approval of Harry Price.

It appears, in fact, that the first time this notion occurred
to defendants was in the course of the preparation for trial.
The record here is clear and convincing and the evidence is overwhelming that when Exhibits E and J were signed by the tvvo
women, they intended to be bound and they intended to perform the transaction according to the terms of Exhibit E. The
suggestion that they might have had different intentions at
the time appears clearly to have been an afterthought. There
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is no rule of law to the effect that the signatures of one tenant
in common is presumed to be conditional upon obtaining
signatures of others, especially here, where there is no reliance
placed upon the judgment of Harry Price throughout the
entire deal. Instead, reliance was placed totally on the judgment of Mrs. Price. She was the real guiding power behind
the title to the property. It is not, of course, contended that
she had authority to bind Harry Price as such, but it is certainly
ridiculous, considering all the facts and circumstances, to assert
here that she did not intend to be bound until her husband
affixed his signature to the two exhibits. It can hardly be said
that the Findings of the Trial Court on this question are not
supported by the evidence.
Appellants argue in Point IV of their brief that the enforcement of Exhibit E is inequitable as to the women because
of an alleged misunderstanding of the contents and effect
of that document. They argue that it was not filled in when it
was signed and they argue that Mr. Hansen represented that
they were bound unless the defendant Harry Price signed the
exhibit. (Appellants' brief, 81-96).
As elsewhere in their brief, defendants entirely skirted
the obvious objection to their position in this regard, viz: that
the Court found the facts against them. The Trial Court
specifically, as herein stated and as stated in Point III of this
brief, that Exhibit E constituted the agreement of the parties,
and that they knew the contents of the exhibit when it was executed. The Court found squarely against them in their contention that Hansen told them that their signatures would be
conditional.
20

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

It is again pointed out to the Court that whether or not
Hansen told them that their signaures were conditional would
be purely a question of oral testimony, and the Court's conclusion was upon admittedly conflicting statements of the
witnesses. The Trial Court heard and observed the witnesses.
The finding of the Court is explicit. The entire argument of
appellants was based upon a finding they hoped to obtain but
in which they failed. The argument is entirely fallacious and
irrelevant.

The Court's finding on this point is also a complete answer
to the point made by defendants in Sub-section 3 of their
Point No. III. Exhibit E has not been charged or separated
to make an agreement contrary to the intent of the parties.
Exhibit E is the agreement of the parties, and when it was
signed by the women, when Harry Price told Hansen to proceed to close the Terry transaction and the deal was all right
with him, he and they were fully advised of the contents of
that exhibit.
Certainly the primary arguments of the defendants fail
when they are reconsidered in the light of the findings of
the Trial Court on the facts.

(b) The purchase money receipt identified as rrExhibit E"
was filled in and in its present form except for the signature
of Ravarino at the time it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs.
Parr.
One of the factual questions discussed in appellants' brief
is whether Exhibits E and J were completed at the time they
were signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr. Defendants and
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appellants urge the Court to adopt their view of the matter,
which was that they were signed in blank. The Trial Court
found "that said contract (Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement) was complete and the blanks all filled in as above set
forth at the time Mrs. Parr and Mrs. Price signed said agreement, and all defendants were aware of the terms of the agreement and the signatures of sellers prior to the signature of
plaintiff * * * ."
The testimony of Mr. Hansen upon this question is as
unequivocal and direct as testimony could possibly be. He
testified as follows:

J then filled in other
than the signature of Mollerup and Ravarino?

"Q. Was both Exhibit E and

A. Exactly as they are--Mrs. Price was sitting here,
and I was here, and they were made out just exactly that way.

Q. They were filled out in her. presence ?
A. Right, no question in the world about that." (R.
237).
It is true that there is a conflict of evidence on this point.

However, the Trial Court found directly and squarely that
the blanks were filled in at the time the signatures of .Mrs.
Price and Mrs. Parr were obtained. The record amply supports
the finding of the Court, and there is no reason in this case
why this finding should not be sustained on appeal.
The findings of the Trial Court are a complete answer
again to the arguments of appellants to the effect that Exhibit
E is uncertain and the arguments made under Point IV that
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some mistake was made by someone as to the transaction agreed
upon. Certainly it is apparent from the record that women of
the determina~ion and experience, and with the personalities
of Mrs. Price and Mrs .. Parr, did not sign Exhibit E without
knowing what they were doing. They had been discussing
this transaction with Hansen for several weeks; particularly
1\Irs. Price was fully aware of every detail, including a description of the property and the fact that defendants were receiving $19,000.00 in cash. The argument that defendants were
unaware of the significance of their act is .most incongruous.
Throughout their depositions all three of the defendants
referred to their act as involving "their property on Fifth
South." It is submitted that they knew perfectly well all of the
implications of the writing on Exhibit E at the time it was
signed and at all times subsequent thereto.

(c) Ravarino purchased the Terry strip in reliance upon
Harry Price's promise to complete the transaction.
It is respondent's intention in this portion of the argument to invite the Court's attention to the various portions
of the record which support the Trial Court's determination
of the facts with respect to Harry Price's promise and Ravarino' s purchase of the Terry strip in reliance thereon. The
legal effect of the facts will be argued in a separate point as
a proposition of law.
The Court found "that following the signing of said
Earnest Money Receipt and Agreement, and the oral assurance of the defendant Harry Price, Jr., that he accepted, ratified and acknowledged said contract and would sell the property in accordance therewith, and after the said Harry Price,
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Jr., had been advised by Hansen that the plaintiff intended to
buy the said strip of property 19' x 66' adjoining the said
property described in Paragraph 2 on the South, and after
the said Hansen, having advised Harry Price, Jr., that the
plaintiff would and could have no use for said property and
would not buy it unless he was sure the said Harry Price, Jr.,
would complete the sale of said property described in Paragraph 2 in accordance with the contract of sale, and after the
assurance of said Harry Price, Jr., that he would sell the property in accordance with the Earnest Money Receipt signed
by his wife and sister, and relying upon the assurance of Harry
Price, Jr., that he would convey as aforesaid, the said plaintiff then purchased the said adjoining strip of land 19' x 66'
for the purchase price of $1,796.00; that Harry Price, Jr.,
with full knowledge aforesaid that plaintiff was going to buy
said strip of property on the assurance of Harry Price, Jr., that
he would sell and convey his property aforesaid in accordance with the Earnest Money Receipt for the purpose of providing access to plaintiff to said property to be purchased from
Harry Price, Jr., told the plaintiff to proceed with the purchase
of said property and that he would convey in accordance with
the Earnest Money Agreement"
Appellants have argued in considerable length and with
some considerable repetition that the purchase by Ravarino
of the Terry strip was not in reliance upon the promise of
Price to complete the transaction. Emphasis is placed on some
testimony of Ravarino, Sr., from which it is apparent that
Mr. Ravarino refers to a later conversation, in November,
after Price had decided that his property was "too hot" to
complete the transaction.
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It appears that Hansen had discussed the Terry strip with
both plaintiff and defendants for some time prior to September 21st. Hansen stated: "I had an offer for a long time
on the Terry property that could not go through until the
Ravarinos were purchasing the Price property. * * * So the
offer was held up until we were positive that the Prices were
selling to Ravarinos" (R. 130).
On September 21, 1950, the signatures of the two women
were obtained on Exhibits E and J. The contents of Exhibit
E were explicitly reported to Mr. Price on the same day that
Exhibit E was signed by Mrs. Price and Mr. Price was informed
at the same time that Mr. Honsen had available to him the
$19,000.00 to complete the transaction (R. 97). Hansen explained to Price that the agreement was represented by Exhibit E (R. 98) .
Harry Price also knew of the particular importance of
the Terry strip because Hansen had told him about it many
times and had expressed the opinion to him that it was important that the Terry strip go with defendants' property (R.
130, 131).
A few days after September 21st, Hansen called Harry
Price on the telephone and stated to him that "it looks like
everything is okeh and I just want to be sure there won't be
any backing out." Hansen told Price that Ravarino wanted
to complete the transaction to obtain the Terry strip so that
trackage would be available "to get freight cars in there from
First South." Hansen said: "I told him we were ready to close
that now and I wanted to be sure there wouldn't be any
trouble." He said further: "I want to be sure because if Rava-
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rino has that it will be like a goat farm, because he won't
have any right-of-way to it." Price assured Hansen, "It is
all right" (R. 87, 88). The deed to the Terry property was
obtained "close to that date, I think October 5th was when
we made the deed" (R. 88).
Hansen testified that after his conversation with Price
he then saw Mr. Ravarino, and on October 5th he obtained
the Terry deed, which was introduced into evidence in this
case as "Exhibit N." The check from Angelo Ravarino for
$19,000.00 was obtained apparently on the same date as the
deed. Ravarino himself stated that he gave Hansen a check
for $19,000.00 after the women had signed Exhibit E and
that he signed the check at the time he bought the Terry
property (R. 244). Ravarino told Hansen that he did not
want the Terry property unless he was sure he was getting
the Price property (R. 244).
The Court's attention is invited to the fact that on September 29, 1950, the plaintiff had already submitted to Edward M. Morrissey, an attorney in Salt Lake City, the two
abstracts of title introduced in this action as "Exhibit A" and
"Exhibit B," and that Mr. Morrissey on that date wrote title
opinions covering these abstracts. The opinions were introduced in this case as "Exhibit L." This date is important because Harry Price turned over the abstracts to his attorney,
Ted Cannon, for delivery to Mr. Morrissey prior, of course,
to the date of their examination. Mr. Price certainly had unmistakably given evidence of his intention to be bound by the
terms of "Exhibit E" at that time. It appears from Exhibit P,"
which is a title opinion from Mr. E. C. Jensen to l\1r. Ben C.
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Rich, on the Mollerup property, that Mr. Price and the other
defendants on that date considered that the deal was completed. Mr.. Jensen in that title opinion, "Exhibit P," gives
various instructions for the clarification of the title to the
ollerup property in anticipation of the unexpected conveyance
to defendants in this action.
"Exhibit K," a series of statements from McGhie Abstract
Tile Company to Hansen Realty, demonstrates that all
of the abstracts in question were completed and the bill sent
on or before September 28, 1950.

&

The real estate men considered that defendants went
into possession of the Mollerup property on October 1st (see
testimony of Rich, R. 145), and Harry Pri~e saw no reason
after his conversation with Hansen why Hansen could not
turn over to Mollerup $5,000.00 of the $18,000.00 which was
going from Ravarino to defendants (R. 148, 149).
Following the actual delivery of the Terry deed to Ravarino, there ensued a number of telephone conversations between Hansen and Price. Hansen testified that Price talked
with him on the telephone dozens of times and on each ~cca
sion Hansen stated that he would be into sign the deeds and
instruments of conveyance the next day, or that he was going
out of town, or that he wanted to check one little angle or
another, but always he was stating to Hansen that he intended
to complete the transaction (R. 94, 95, 96).
Finally, some time in November, Mr. Ed Jensen, who
had been employed by Mr. Price to examine the abstracts
on the Mollerup property, informed Mr. Hansen that he
27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

thought his client was "dragging his feet," (R. 126) and it
appears that in the early part of November, Mr. Price came
into the office of Hansen Realty Company and stated to Hansen
that "that is hot property, I am not going to go through with
it" (R. 95). It appears that Mr. Price was never asked to
sign "Exhibit E" (R. 96), but that he was advised as to every
detail of "Exhibit E" and that he knew that the Terry deed
had been obtained and paid for in reliance on his promise to
complete the transaction according to the Exhibit (R. 96).
Harry Price considered that the deal was made.
The fact is that Hansen had a conversation with Price
to the effect that Hansen should pay a mortgage in the amount
o f$1500.00 to the Tracy Loan & Trust Company out of the
mon~y that Hansen had from Ravarino to pay to defendants
(R. 97). Price saw no reason why Hansen should not turn
$5,000.00 over to him for him to give Mollerup, so that
Mollerup could get certain discounts on merchandise he had
purchased (R. 148, 149).
There can be absolutely no doubt that the Trial Court
was not only justified but virtually .compelled to find, in view
of this overwhelming and convincing evidence, that Price knew
exactly the terms of the transaction intended by the parties,
and that he knew that Ravarino did not intend to proceed
further with the Terry deal until Price had given his consent.
At the time Hansen talked with Price about the Terry strip, no
one had any doubt as to what was expected of Mr. Price. Mr.
Hansen said in substance and effect that Ravarino wanted to
buy the Terry property, provided that Price was willing to
complete the transaction pursuant to the provisions of Exhibit
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E. Mr. Price replied unequivocally that he would proceed
with the transaction and Mr. Ravarino proceeded to acquire
the Terry strip in reliance upon this representation.
The Trial Court so determined the facts. Judge Baker in
effect found the fact to be as contended by plaintiff in his
complaint in this action. Certainly the evidence justifies this
finding. There is no question but what the finding is clear
and that it correctly reflects the record with respect to the
subject matter it contains. The very fact that the appellants
in this case do not endeavor to controvert the finding is mdicative o\ the weightiness which it carries.
Appellants argue on Pages 30 and 31 of their brief
that no reliance can be placed upon these brief remarks, because they do not "constitute any kind of a promise or offer
at all." Certainly the Court must be aware of the manner in
which assent is manifest in the business world. Businessmen
rarely say, with technical nicety, "I offer to do thus and so"
and answer "I accept the offer." The conversation which Harry
Price had with Hansen cannot be considered outside of the
context in which it occurred. Hansen said in substance, are
you or are you not going to proceed with this deal ? My client
desires to know so that he can protect his interests accordingly.
Mr. Price realized the significance of his own words
because he considered himself bound after the conversation,
and, in fact, at all times up through the date in November
in which he repudiated the transaction he dealt with the property involved as though he was bound, and there is nothing
ambiguous or uncertain in his dealing toward any of it.
29
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Ravarino purchased the Terry property immediately following
the conversation. He gave Hansen $19,000.00 at the same
time, clearly indicating that he believed, with Price, that the
bargain was complete, that only the detail of obtaining the
deed remained.

(d) Both of the lots of defendants on Fifth South were
included in the transac.tion.

Appellants state on Page 5 of their brief that the "undisputed testimony" is that only the lot with the warehouse
upon it on Fifth South was to be conveyed in the transaction
involved in this lawsuit. Probably no portion of appellants'
argument is more indicative of their efforts to create confusion
after this dispute arose over facts that were perfectly well
understood at the time the transaction was agreed upon than
is this argument. The two women come into court and testify that only one lot is involved when they have signed an
Earnest Money Receipt describing the property as 165 x 165
feet, and when it appears that all the negotiations with reference to the sale of the property included all of defendants'
property on Fifth South. What appellants refer to as "undisputed testimony" in their brief appears to be somewhat of
an ingenious afterthought. Certainly the Trial Court would
not have been justified in finding anything else than that the
entire tract on Fifth South, 165 x 165 feet, was to be sold to
plaintiff.
It is particularly interesting that appellants contend that
this Court should reverse the Trial Court on the fact that
because the "documentary evidence tells the whole story,"
and yet they assert that these women believed, despite the
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unambiguous dscription in Exhibit E, that only part of the
land was involved. The fact is that every document introduced in evidence in this case demonstrates that defendants
thought all of their property was being sold. Defendant Harry
Price admits explicitly that there was no misunderstanding
on his part. He knew that all the property was involved from
the very beginning. There was no occasion for him to discuss
any different arrangement with his wife (R. 236).
Attention is again invited to the finding of the Trial
Court and the evidence supporting the finding that at the
time Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr signed Exhibit E it was filled
in and in its present form, describing the lot 165 x 165 feet
(R. 2}7).
Both abstracts covering in the aggregate the same property described in the Earnest Money Receipt were turned over
to plaintiff's attorney for examination, and the opinions of
Edward M. Morrissey describe both pieces of property. They
are dated September 29, 1950, after the entire transaction was
worked out and agreed upon. The documents, of transfer
(Exhibit G and Exhibit 0) describe all of defendants' property on Fifth South. These documents ·were present at the
conversations which occurred in Hansen's office after the purchase of the Terry strip (R. 91). No objection was raised
to any of these descriptions at the time of these conversations
(R. 91, 92). Apparently there was no doubt at this time that
the Fifth South property was being conveyed, because the
defendants and real estate men were present at these conversations. Moreover, these documents or copies were submitted
to Ed Jensen (R. 146), and apparently he had them in his
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possession at the time he prepared the Demand to Mr. Mollerup (R. 92, 207, 208). Even at the time the first
answer was prepared and filed on or about February 9, 1951,
there was no question about the description of the property
in Exhibit E (R. 5 and particularly Par. 5). The evidence
upon which defendants base their argument in this respect
is certainly most unreliable; it consists of the statements of
the women as to their state of mind and the appraisal of Mr.
Schulter, made out of the presence of any other witnesses.
It appears from the record that like several other of the
defenses, the suggestion that there was only intended to be
one lot conveyed to Mr. Ravarino was an afterthought, in-·
spired by the placing of the case upon the trial calendar. Certainly there is ample and convincing support in the evidence
for the finding of the Trial Court that all of defendants'
property was included in the transaction.

(e) The rule that the findings of the Trial Court .on conflicting evidence will not be disturbed on appeal is applicable
in this case.

While the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article VIII,
Section 9, gives this Court the power to review factual as well
as legal questions on appeal in equity cases, this Court has
uniformly held that the finding of the Trial Court on conflicting evidence in an equity case will not be set aside, unless the
Trial Court manifestly misapplied facts or made findings
against the great weight of the evidence. Olivero v. Eleganti,
61 Ut. 475, 214 Pac. 313; Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Ut. 329, 226
Pac. 177; Bennett v. Bowen, 65 Ut. 444, 238 Pac. 240; Hansen
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iVlutual Finance Corporation, et al., 84 Ut. 579, 37 Pac.
(2d) 782; Hoyt z·. Upper lYiarion Ditch Co., 94 Ut. 134, 134,
76 Pac. (2d) 234; Stanley Z'. Stanley, 97 Ut. 520, 94 Pac. (2d)
465; Tanner v. Provo Reset·voir Co., 99 Ut. 139, 98 Pac.
(2d) 695; rehearing denied 99 Ut. 158, 103 Pac. (2d) 134;
Bear River State Bank z·. L1lerrill, 101 Ut. 176, 120 Pac. (2d)
325; Prowitt v. Lunt, 103 Ut. 574, 13·7 Pac. (2d) 361.

l'.

This rule has been uniformly applied in equity cases and
has been held applicable in varying factual circumstances.
The rule has been variously stated by this court and has been
variously stated as well by courts of other jurisdictions, but
the fundamental meaning and purpose of the rule is clear.
Where the trial court has seen the witnesses, observed their
demeanor on the wittess stand, has heard the entire evidence,
it is, of course, in a better position to judge the credibility
of witnesses and to determine what inferences might properly
be drawn from the various testimony.
It is submitted that in this case there is no justification
for failure to apply this rule ~o the ultimate factual questions.
Admittedly there was a considerable disparity in the testimony
of the defendants and the other witnesses with respect to
certain basic factual questions. The defendants and appellants, however, do not even argue directly that the findings
of the Trial Court were not supported by the evidence. Conflicting inferences might be drawn and more weight might
be given to certain testimony than to other testimony, evidence
and circumstances proved to the Court, but the Trial Court
observed and analyzed all of these circumstances and contradictions. The conflicts and the evidence were resolved and
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the Trial Court made its findings with respect to the ultimate
questions of fact in issue.
It is felt that a careful reading of the record will conclusively demonstrate that the overwhelming weight of the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom preponderates in favor of the plaintiff's position throughout the
proceedings. The findings are supported by the evidence and
the findings are not disputed by any uncontroverted evidence
in the case.

The appellants assert that "the documentary evidence
tells the whole story," and "on these documents rests also any
question of credibility here so that this Court is in as good
a position on such matters as the tria\ court" (Appellants'
brief, Page 4). No sooner have the appellants spoken these
words, however, than they proceed to explain to the Court
in their Statement of Facts and in their Argument the reliance
placed upon conversations between and among the parties
in the case.
It is perfectly apparent from reading the appellants'
brief, and from the discussion of the factual issues in this
brief, that the documents do not tell the whole story. The
entire theory against the defendant Harry Price is equitable
estoppel and is based upon some oral statements made by
him to the real estate agent handling the transaction for the
plaintiff in this case. If the documents tell the whole story,
then why is it possible for the defendants Mrs. Price and
Mrs. Parr to contradict, argue with, dispute and attempt to
evade the plain and unambiguous language on Exhibit E,
introduced in this action? It is too plain for argument that
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the documents do not tell the
necessary in this case to resort
concerning conversations and
written or undisputed evidence

whole story, and that it was
to the testimony of witnesses
occurrences outside of any
or testimony.

POINT NO. II
"EXHIBIT E" WAS THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE PARTIES.
The greater part of defendants' brief has been an attempt
to avoid the fact that Exhibit E was the contract for the sale
of defendants' property. In reply to that we wish to submit
the following to the Court.
In Finding No. 6 Judge Baker sets forth in full "Exhibit
E" and finds that it was signed by Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr
with knowledge that Harry Price, Jr., had approved the terms,
and that the signatures of Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr were not
affixed conditionally in any manner whatsoever; that all defendants were aware of the terms of the Agreement, and that
plaintiff signed the Agreement two or three days after the signing and approval of that Agreement by defendants; that all defendants agreed to sell to plaintiff the said land in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the Earnest Money Receipt
and Agreement, and that plaintiff agreed to purchase in accordance with that Agreement; that Harry Price, Jr., ratified,
approved and acknowledged the contract as his own and is
estopped to assert the defense of the statute of frauds for
his failure to sign the Agreement.
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Ravarino was only concerned with the purchase of the
Price property. What the Prices did with this purchase money
was of no concern to him. Whether Price bought other property, bought stocks or put it in a bank account was of no concern
to Ravarino so long as he received his property.
Mr. Ben C. Rich, a real estate agent having the listing
for sale of the Mollerup property, said in his testimony (R.
140):

"A. Well, Mr. Hansen called me up and said he had
a deal on to sell the Price property to the Ravarinos, that Mrs. Price wouldn't sell unless we found
her a piece of good investment property to put the
money in and wanted to know if the Mollerup
property was still available."
Mr. Rich then indicated the events in which the property
had been shown to the parties. Then at R. 140 he stated:

"Q. When was the next incident that occurred?
A. When Mr. Hansen informed me he had an offer
on the property signed by the Prices.

Q. And what was the next thing you did after that conversation?
A. I went down and picked up the offer and took it
down to Mr. Mollerup.
"Mr. Mollerup looked it over . . . it was for
some less than Mr. Mollerup was asking for the
property, but it called for $18,000.00 cash and he
had rieed for the money in his business at that
time . . . "
At R. 142 Rich states:
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"Q. What was the next thing you did in connection
with this transaction?
A. I got the abstracts from lvlr. 11ollerup, sent them
down to Ed Jensen to examine."
At R. 143:

"Q. Had anything been said up to the time the date
of that letter, October 11th, about there being any
trade in this matter ? * * *
A. Yes."

At Page 144 of the record:

"Q. Can you tell me about the date of this conversation?
A. It was between this period of October 1st and Oct.
11th.

* *

* *

Q. Did you ever have any discussions with Mr. Price
relative to any income problems he might have
arising out of the sale of his property ?

A. The information came to me from Mr. Hansen,
that Mr. Price was worried about the income features of the property, of the deal, so I told Mr.
Hansen that I would check up with the Internal
Revenue Bureau and get a ruling on it.
Q. And that conversation you have given was dated
sometime between October 1st and October 11th?

A. So I called the Internal Revenue Bureau, setting the
facts of this transaction as a hypothetical question,
I didn't state the names of the parties, I just
called Mr. Wise, giving him the facts of this hypothetical question. I asked if it would be taxable .
.)7
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He said not tor trade, income property would be
tax free and I related that information to Mr.
Hansen.

* * * *
Q. Up to the point of the conversation with Mr. Hansen as far as you know there was no transaction,
no writing, no oral statement different than the
provision of Exhibit J which you have there, the
earnest money receipt?
A. Not as far as we are concerned there was not."
Again at R. 145 Mr. Rich states;

"Q. I will ask you this, what was this $18,000.00
to be?
A. It was to be money, cash."
Again at R. 156, on cross-examination, Mr. Mulliner asked
Mr. Rich this, question and received this answer:

"Q. And as far as you knew the deal as it was expected to go was a trade of the Price and the Mollerup property?
A. No, as originally signed up, it was· a cash deal to
Mr. Mollerup as it was originally signed up but
it was adjusted later to this to help Mr. Price's tax
situation."
In the examination of Mrs. Parr at R. 198 appears the
following testimony:

" * * * Well, you see if we have this: You were
selling to Ravarino, which determined the value that
there would be for your Fifth South property?
ANSWER: Yes."
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The following is the excerpt from the deposition of Mrs.
Parr as it appears at R. 195:
"ANSWER: No, when I talked to my sister-in-law
what was to be done, we were to pay so much down
and the balance in monthly payments at a set price * * *
QUESTION: The amount that you paid down would
be the amount you would get from the Ravarino sale?
ANSWER: Uh huh."
From all the foregoing it is clear that as indicated by the
evidence, there were two separate contracts, Exhibit E for
the sale and purchase of the Price property and Exhibit J for
the sale and purchase of the Mollerup property. As to the
Mollerup property, the sum realized by the Prices and Mrs.
Parr from the sale of their property was to be used as the
down payment for the purchase of the Price property.,
Exhibit E, as found by Judge Baker, was fully understood
and known by both the Prices and Ravarino, was exhibited
by them, and the evidence amply supports the Finding of
Judge Baker that the parties intended to proceed in accordance with its terms and were bound by it. The details of
arranging for the conveyance to Mollerup were of no consequence to Ravarino so long as he received title to the property.
The fact that Price desired to have title come to Ravarino
through Mollerup was not even known by Ravarino until
after Exhibits E and J were signed (R. 109).
The original answer of defendants contained no reference
to any "trade" rather than sale. The claim to an exchange
agreement first appeared in the amended answer of May 22,
1951, filed just prior to the trial setting in the spring of 1951.
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It is, of course, clear from the record that the conversation between Mr. Price and Mr. Hansen which resulted in the
purchase of the Terry property was a few days after the execution of Exhibits E and J by the women. Prior to this conversation, Hansen had explained every detail of the transaction
to Harry Price.

Argument is made in appellants' brief to the effect that
the· plaintiff did not rely upon Price's promises when he purchased the Terry strip. Appellants refer to some testimony of
Ravarino when Price said, 'Tm going on the road five or
six days and when I come back I will let you know, yes pr no."
This argument could be answered appropriately under
Point III of this brief, but since it also concerns the agreement
of the parties and the relationship that existed because of that
agreement, it is mentioned here. The conversation referred
to by Ravarino in which Price said, "I will let you know,
yes or no,'' clearly occurred long after the rights of the parties
had become fixed because of the execution of Exhibits E and
J and the purchase of the Terry property. It is perfectly clear
that Mr. Ravarino never met Mr. Price until sometime toward
the last part of October or the first part of November, when
Price went down to see them at their place of business. Price
himself states that he only had one conversation in his life
with Ravarino (R. 234), and that occurred in Ravarino's
office at approximately the time the summons was served upon
Price in this action (R. 235). It resulted from Hansen's call
to Price in which Price was told that "Ravarino is really on
my back." Ravarino was told in this conversation by Price that
"I didn't think I was going through with that deal."
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It is interesting to note that Price was told at this time
that the Terry strip had been purchased and that the architect
had been employed to draw the plans and the steel had been
purchased, apparently for the construction of a building.
Price's remark was "that's up to you, he hasn't my property,
and that's up to you buying that strip." Price stated that he
t..'lought "they got a little wild about it, especially the elderly
Mr. Ravarino" (R. ibid.) This was the only conversation
which Price ever had with Ravarino, and it is somewhat ridiculous for appellants to try to breathe something into the testimony of Mr. Ravarino, particularly in view of the obvious
language difficulties he was having during his examination
and cross-examination. All Ravarino said about his conversation
with Price was that even at that late time he was told that the ·
two women were still willing to proceed on the transaction
but that Harry Price was welching on the deal. This is consistent with the notice given by Ed Jensen to Mollerup that
the women were ready to proceed.

Even at this, late time Harry Price, m his conversation
with Ravarino, was not making any alibis for not performing
along the lines of the defenses made in this case. There is no
indication that there was any question in his mind that the
plaintiff was entitled to the property. There was no question
that Exhibit E did not constitute the agreement. The only
excuse for non-performance that Harry Price suggested to
anybody until after this lawsuit was well underway was that
his property was "hot" and that he "was not going through
with that deal" (R. 23 5) .
Appellants have attempted in this case, by the selection
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of approximately a half dozen lines of the testimony of Angelo
Ravarino, to support their position that the terms of the
agreement were not definite and that there was no reliance by
Ravarino upon Price's promise at the time Ravarino purchased
the Terry strip. The quotation from Ravarino's testimony is:
"I signed that and at the same time we buy Terry property, see?"
Counsel for appellants have misquoted this statement of the
record to have it read as follows: "I signed that (Exhibit E)
at the same time we buy the Terry property, see." The leaving
out of the word "and" is certainly most significant in the
testimony of the elderly Italian who has the evident difficulty
with the English language as did Angelo Ravarino. The foregoing appears at Page 244 of the record.
Again we quote: "I gave Mr. Hansen one week. You
know he come so many times in my place, so I gave Mr.
Hansen one week, if you fix it up, fix it up for 19,000, okey,
I give you one week.''
Here again counsel have omitted the significant part
of the testimony which appears at page 242 of the record,
. wherein the following is to be added to the testimony of
Ravarino, identifying the time and the date which he might
have had in mind in referring to Exhibit E: "Two, three
days later he came and bring me that book and say Mrs. Price
and Price's sister they all fix up and sign and I give this thing,
I give it to my lawyer-." The foregoing appears on Page 242
of the record.
Counsel also omit from Ravarino' s testimony the following answers and questions as they appear at Page 244 of the
record:
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"Q. Did you ask Mr. Hansen before you bought the Terry
property if the deal was closed because you didn't
want the Terry property without the Price property?
A. Mr. Hansen said Mrs. Price and Price's sister they
sign and everything will be okeh, and the time was
okeh and everything will be okeh that time. He
said, 'You better get the money ready so we can
pay them.' That is when I gotand cash $11,000.00
U. S. Bonds and I never get nothing, if I have it
now I have 11,000, I lose already 1,600 besides
that, let me tell you."
"MR. H. L. MULLINER: I object to it, Your Honor.
Q. (BY MR. BURTON): Now, in the conversation
to Hansen, was anything said about your not wanting the Terry property unless you were sure you
had the Price property?
A. Sure, I told him.
MR. H. L. MULLINER: Let me state, the Court
please, Mr. Hansen told us what it was, what is
the use of coming back with this now?
MR. BURTON: It is to showTHE COURT: Well, he answered the question.
MR: BURTON: That is all."

From the foregoing it is clear that Mr. Mulliner, Sr.,
had conceded to the Court and counsel that Hansen had given
the story of the conversation with Price in reliance on which
Ravarino proceeded to buy the Terry property.
In the face of this explicit concession made by counsel
during the trial, the appellants come back in their brief, following ·a brief cross-examination of the witness on the very
43
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

subject, through the use of approximately a hair dozen lines
of his testimony, and assert that he did not rely upon Price's
promise in the purchose of the Terry property.
It is submitted that the whole record demonstrates the
certainty of the agreement and the definiteness of the reliance
thereupon by the plaintiff in the purchase of the Terry strip.

POINT NO. III
DEFENDANT HARRY PRICE IS ESTOPPED IN
EQUITY TO DENY HIS PROMISE AND AGREEMENT
TO BE BOUND PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF EXHIBIT E.
The Trial Court found and the evidence is that the following developments occurred in sequence:

( 1) Harry Price signed the listing agreement with Hansen
for the sale of the Fifth South property owned by the defendants (R. 250}.
( 2) Hansen reported an offer to Price, who reported it
to his wife. Hansen was told by Price that the offer did not
agree with Mrs. Price, particularly because she wanted other
income property, and everything he could work out with Mrs.
Price would be agreeable and acceptable to Harry Price.
( 3) Mr. and Mrs. Price were both shown the Mollerup
property and after some discussion Mrs. Price and Mrs. Parr
signed "Exhibit E" and "Exhibit J" in their present form.
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( 4) "Exhibit E.. was explained in every detail to Mr.
Price by Mr. Hansen. Every requirement and provision of
Exhibit E was explained to and discussed by Mr. Price.
( 5) Abstracts were brought to date and examined, and
a few days after th;; explanation of Exhibit E to Mr. Price,
Hansen told Price that the plaintiff Ravarino desired to purchase the Terry strip of trackage. Price was told that Ravarino
did not want to buy the strip unless Price was going through
with the transaction as explained to him. He further was told
that the strip would be nothing more than a goat farm unless
he agreed to sell to the plaintiff in conformity with the agreement of the two women. Hansen was told by Price in this
conversation to go ahead with the deal and for Ravarino to buy
the Terry strip.
( 6) The plaintiff Ravarino did in fact purchase the Terry
strip and the deed of conveyance was executed to him. At the
same time plaintiff left with Hansen for delivery to defendants
the purchase price for the Fifth South property.

(7} Closing documents were prepared and approved and
possession taken of the Mollerup property.

( 8) Various telephone conversations occurred between
Price and Hansen on the one hand and Hansen and Ed .Jensen,
representing Price, and after a number of such conversations,
Jensen told Hansen that Price was dragging his feet.
(9) About the first part of November, Price told Hansen
that his property was 'too hot to sell," in substance, and that
he was refusing to go along with the deal.
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Of particular importance, of course, is the conversation
between Mr. Price and Mr. Hansen, and that conversation
has been reported in detail to the Court in this brief. There
is no question, and can be no doubt, that the plaintiff purchased the land from the Terrys in direct reliance upon Price's
statement to Hansen that he, Price, would convey the land.
The real question in this case is whether under the circumstances, and in view of the factual determinations of the Trial
Court with respect to the controverted issues of fact, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is applicable.
This presents the real legal issue in the case. We submit
that the appellants have skirted the problem, dodged it and
attempted to evade it. The Trial Court, however, faced it
squarely and concluded that defendant Harry Price was
estopped under all the facts and circumstances to deny liability
pursuant to the understanding expressed in Exhibit E. We
think this Court will affirm the determination of the Trial
Court on this question upon a full consideration of the basic
doctrine of equitable estoppel as applied to the facts.
The doctrine is, of course, a development of the chancellor to avoid the harshness and frequently the downright injustice of the Statute of Frauds. Pomeroy describes generally
the doctrine in Section 803 of his work on equity jurisprudence, (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Volume 2,
pages 163·5, etc.) He defines the doctrine as follows:
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary
conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded
both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which
might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of prop-
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erty, of contract, or of remedy, as against another
person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position
for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or
of remedy."
Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed, Sec. 804.
doctrine is stated in Corpus Juris as follows:

The

"As a general rule, where a person with actual or
constructive knowledge of the facts induces ·another
by his words or conduct to believe that he acquiesces or
ratifies a transaction, or that he will offer no opposition thereto, and that another, in reliance on such belief, alters his position, such person is estopped_ from
repudiating the transaction to the other's prejudice.
(31 CJ 112).
Appellants in their brief apparently take the position that
there must both be part performance and fraud for the application of the doctrine of equitable estappel (Appellants' Brief
Point 2, particularly pages 41, etc.) Appellants' argument in
this respect, however, which seems to infer that both part performance and equitable estoppel must be proved to make a
case, is totally lacking in substance and is certainly an improper
analysis of the basic doctrine involved. The editor of 75 ALR,
651, discusses the historical and analytical relations between
the doctrines of estoppel and part performance as a basis for
the enforcement of contracts. He states:
"One cause of the misconception of the basis of the
doctrine of part performance probably lies in the
requisite of this doctrine that the acts relied upon
must have been done in pursuance of the contract, and
must be referable thereto. This requirement is pri-
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marily intended not to assure the probative integrity
of the acts in question, but to show that the plaintiff
relied upon the agreement and upon the defendant's
inducement or acquiescence, such reliance being a prerequisite element of estoppel. The relative trustworthiness of the acts as evidence was probably considered
by the courts in formulating and limiting the doctrine
of part performance; but, if so, this consideration was
merely an argument in favor of the feasibility and safeness of applying principles of estoppel in such cases, and
was not the real basis of the doctrine. In other words,
this consideration may have been a justification of the
doctrine, but it was not the basis thereof."
The editor concludes, after quoting Story on Equity Jurisprudence, 14th Ed. Sec. 1005, 1047, and Pomery Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. Sec. 1409, that:
"The weight of authority recognizes the rule to be
based upon estoppel or fraud."
The editor states significantly at the conclusion of the annotation:
"Estoppel, to assert the statute of frauds, is no
more a subversion of the law than is estoppel to take
advantage of any other firmly established legal principle, whether embodied in a statute or not. The
principle of estoppel is of equal dignity with the statute
of frauds, and is perhaps even more indispensable as
a protection against fraud." (Emphasis supplied).
Attention is invited to the further fact that the fraud
concerned is not actual fraud in the sense of "a willful deception, but simply it is unconscientious; much less do they assert
that there was actual fraud-willful deception-in the act
of entering into the verbal contract." (See Pomery Equity
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Juprisprudence, supra, Sec. 803, where the author points out
that the fraud which constitutes the estoppel may consist of
of acts, words, or silence, with or without an intention to de-

ceive.)
Attention is also invited to the annotations at 101 A.L.R.
923, 945, et seq. with respect to the doctrine of part performance in suits in equity for specific performance of parol contracts to convey real estate and the Comment Note at 117
A.L.R. 939 concerning the relationship between the doctrines of
equitable estoppel and part performance.
It now appears as to be well established that the doctrine
that part performance will take an oral contract out of the
statute of frauds rests essentially upon the ground of estoppel.
See Wolfe, Administratrix, et al. vs. Wallingford . .Bank &
Trust Co., 124 Conn. 507, 1 Atl. (2d) 143, 117 A.L.R. 932.
The following language of ~he Court in that case is of interest
in the case at bar:

"The estoppel in such a case as the one before us
makes enforcible an agreement in all respects complete and valid except that compliance with the statute
of frauds is lacking; by preveting the defendant from
setting up that statute to defeat his agreement. Insofar as DeLucia vs. Witz, 92 Conn. 416, 103 Atl. 117,
is contrary to the conclusion here reached, it must be
overruled.
"Two other claims of the defendant require but
brief mention. One is that an actual design or intent
to deceive or defraud must exist in the maker at the
time of his representation or promise to afford the
basis of an estoppel. The law is not so. 'In this connection the meaning given to fraud or fraudulent is
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virtually synonymous with unconscientious or inequitable. The fraud may and generally does consist of the
subsequent attempt to controvert the representation
and to get rid of its effects, and~)hus to injure the
one who has relied on it, or, as it has been stated,
equitable estoppel arises when the conduct of the
party estopped is fraudulent in its purpose or unjust
in its results.' 10 R.C.L. 691, Sec. 20; Seymour vs.
Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 796, 106 Pac. 88, 94, 134 Am.
St. Rep. 154.''
It is, of course, clear that equitable estoppel is available
with respect to a defense of the statute of frauds. The editor
of Ruling Case Law states:
"It has frequently been asserted as a broad general
rule that a. court of equity will not permit a party to
shelter himself under the defense of the statute and
thereby commit a fraud on the other party to the contract. This principle is not limited to any particular
class ·of contracts and has been applied to a contract
of employment not to be performed within a year.
An equitable estoppel may also be invoked to preclude a party to a contract from setting up the defense
of the statute, and it is now generally recognized that
permitting the doctrine of equitable estoppel to operate
in effect to transfer title to real estate does not contravene the statute.''

The principle of equitable estoppel has been explicitly
adopted by this Court. See Hilton v. Slo.an, 37 Utah, 359; 108
Pac. 689; Kerr v. Hillyard, 51 Utah 364, 170 Pac. 981; Tanner
v. Provo Reservoir Co. et al., 76 Utah, 335, 289 Pac. 151;
Bamberger Co. et al. vs. Certified Productions, Inc. et al., 88
Utah 194, 48 Pac. (2d) 489; Latses vs. Nick Floor, Inc., 99
Utah 214, 104 Pac. (2d) 619. As stated by the Court in Bam·
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berger Co. z·s. Certified Productions, Inc. et al., supra, in the
opiinon of Judge Wolfe:
"As stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo, then justice of
the Court of Appeals of New York, in Imperator
Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263, 266: .
'Sometimes the resulting disability has been characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver * * *. We
need not go into the question of the accuracy of the
description. * * * The truth is that we are facing a
principle more nearly ultimate than either waiver or
estoppel, one with roots in the yet larger principle that
no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon
his own inequity or take advantage of his own wrong.
* * * The statute of frauds was not intended to offer
an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle
of justice.'
"We accept this principle. If a party has changed his
position by performing an oral modification so that
it would be inequitable to permit the other party to
found a claim upon the original agreement as unmodified or defeat the former's claim by setting up a defense
that performance was not according to the written ·
contract, after he has induced or consented to the former
going forward, the modified agreement should be held
valid."
and this even though the modification was within the statute
of frauds.
While it may be true that there never has been a case
exactly like the one· at bar, the principle of equitable estoppel
should certainly be applied to the facts in this case, that principle being, "that he who by his language or conduct leads
another to do what he would not otherwise have done, shall
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not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted." 75 A.L.R. 642, 646.
Can there be any doubt that these principles are applicable
to the case at bar?
Attention is again invited to the testimony of Hansen
to the effect that Price unequivocally and definitely stated that
he would go along with the deal and to go ahead and purchase
the Terry property.
It is to be observed in the case at bar that the plaintiff
purchased an interest in real property adjoining the property
owned by the defendants in reliance upon the promise of Price.
Of course, the piece of property that he purchased was in the
nature of an improvement to the defendants' property. How
can one imagine a more valuable improvement to property of
this kind than an adjoining piece of trackage? The trackage
has no value in itself and, in fact, is absolutely worthless. It
constitutes truly a 'goat farm" in the language of the real estate
agent Hansen if it is not used with other property, but it
is in the nature of a valuable real property interest when used
in connection with the real property owned by defendants.
There are two decided cases in which the purchase of
interests in real property in reliance on an oral promise has
been held to constitute acts of reliance within the meaning of
Vogel v. Shaw, 42 Wyo. 333, 294 Pac. 687, and the celebrated
and frequently cited case of Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U. S.
578, 25 L. Ed. 618.
The Vogel case stands for the proposition that where a
promisor represents to a prom1see that if the promisee will
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purchase realty of which the promisor is the leasee, the promisor will assign to the promisee his lease and a sublease and
the promisee buys the property relying upon such representation,
the promisor is estopped in equity to assert the statute of frauds
as a defense where an action is brought involving the right
to the rent paid by the sub-lessee.
The Wyoming Court held explicitly in this case that a
plaintiff was enttiled to rely upon the oral agreement to convey
the lease after he had acted on a promise in good faith, notwithstanding the fact that the lease was clearly within the
statute of frauds in the state of Wyoming. This Wyoming case
is extremely carefully considered; it contains analyses of cases
from Massachusetts, California, the United States Supreme
Court, North Carolina, Iowa, Texas, New York and other
states, and in addition cites a number of well-considered texts
and authorities. The Wyoming Court concluded "over and
over again the courts have said that they will not allow the
defense of the statute of frauds when in so doing it becomes
an instrument for perpetrating fraud. Vogel having used the
promise of an intended abandonment of his rights under the
Files lease to induce Shaw to do what he otherwise would
not have done, should not-in the language of the court of
last resort in this nation-'subject such person to loss or injury
by disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.' In
our judgment the offered proof should have been received
and error was committed by the trial court in not doing so.''
The Dickerson v. Colgrove case, supra, is summarized by
the Wyoming Court as follows:
"There one C owned certain land and died, leaving
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as his only heirs a son and a daughter. On May 3,
1953, the daughter and her husband conveyed all the
land to M by warranty deed. M took possession of the
property. Prior to April 1, 1856, M learned of the
existence of C' s son and that he lived in California.
M caused a letter to be written to the son, inquiring
whether he made any claim to the premises. The son
wrote to his sister in Michigan wherein he said, 'You
can tell Mr. Moreton for me, he needs not fear anything from me * * * I intended to give you and yours
all my property there and more if you need it.' The
contents of this letter came to the knowledge of M,
who took no measures to perfect his title nor to procure redress from the daughter and her husband, who
had conveyed and paid for the whole of the property,
nothwithstanding they owned but half. Thereafter M
conveyed to the defendants, who were numerous and
who also went into possession of the premises so transferred. Subsequently the son in California, by quitclaim deed, passed an undivided one-half of the property to the plaintiffs, who brought a suit in ejectment
against M and his grantees for the land covered by
the quitclaim deed. The trial court held that the son's
grantees were bound by an estoppel in pais and gave
judgment against them. Affirming this judgment and
citing with approval the language of Judge Kendall
in the case of Paxton v. Paxton, the Supreme Court of
the United States significartdy said: 'The estoppel here
relied upon is known as equitable estoppel or an
estoppel in pais. The law upon the subject is well
settled. The vital principle is that he who by his language or conduct leads another to do what he would not
otherwise have done shall not subject such person to
loss or injury by disappointing the expectations upon
which he acted.' "
The Court further said in the Dickerson-Colg1'ove case
that a change of position by a promisor under the circumstances
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there "is sternly forbidden. It involves fraud and falsehood,
and the law abhors both. This remedy is always so applied as
to promote the ends of justice."
A considerable arriount of argument in Appellants' brief
is devoted to the idea that defendants below can avoid the
doctrine of equitable conversion by their last minute tender to
plaintiff of the amount of the purchase price of the Terry
strip. The record shows that the answer was :filed in this action
on February 9, 1951. It was in effect a general denial. The
defendants particularly denied that they had any information
"pertaining to the acquisition by plaintiff of a strip of land
purportedly purchased by him as in said paragraph alleged,
and upon this ground deny the same." This despite the fact
that Harry Price discussed the Terry sale with Mrs. Terry late
in 1950 (R. 37). On the 22nd day of May, after the case was
placed on the trial calendar, defendants came in and made· an
offer to pay plaintiff the amount of the purchase price for
this strip of land.
The entire doctrine of equitable conversion is founded on
the premise that land itself has a peculiar value, and that the
payment of a sum of money would not make whole a promissee who has bargained for land. The very fact in this case
that defendants are now willing to pay some money and that
plaintiff is unwiling to accept, is indicative of the fact that
defendants' property on Fifth South has a value far in excess
of the money expended for the Terry strip.
Look at the first answer of defendants. Look at the position they have taken in this lawsuit. Consider the fact that the
court below found time after time that the facts were con-
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trary to their testimony. Consider the fact that they refused
to do anything until they found themselves backed into a
corner by this lawsuit. The recital demonstrates the fraud
which would be perpetrated upon Ravarino if defendants were
permitted to wiggle out of the position in which they have
placed themselves.
The unfair position assumed in making the offer is further illustrated by an analysis of it. Do they offer to do equity
when they omit the real estate commissions and taxes paid;
loss of the opportunity for valuable land and trackage near
Growers' Market; loss of the use of $19,000.00 for a period
of several months pending this lawsuit; loss of money in
bringing a lawsuit to enforce the contract?
Attention is invited to the similarity of the instant case
and the case of Boelter v. Blake, 12 N. W. (2d) 327. Here
a man and wife held title to a home. A written option for
the purchase of the home by plaintiff was signed by the man
but not the wife. The wife had knowledge of the option. In
decreeing specific performance against the wife, the Court
said:
"The plaintiffs were tenants living in another dwelling owned by the defendants. After some preliminary
negotiations, Mr. and Mrs. Boelter inspected the
Cherrylawn Avenue property, and the terms of its sale
were agreed upon with Mr. Blake. It was orally agreed
that at the end of one year the plaintiffs would purchase the Cherrylawn Avenue place for $3,,500, and
during the year would pay $40 per month, $30 of which
amount would be considered rent and $10 of which
($120 at the end of the year) would be applied on the
down payment. Plaintiffs were also obliged by the
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agreement to pay $300 as the balance of the down
payment to the defendants at the end of the year if
the option to purchase was exercised. The balance of
the $3,500 was to be paid at the rate of $30 per month,
which payments included taxes and insurance. On October 4, 1940, the plaintiffs paid to ~fr. Blake $10
to close the deal and received a receipt therefor which
Mr. Blake testified should read '$10.00 and $30.00
when house is ready. Option for rent at 19434 Cherrylawn'. It is denied that Mrs. Blake took part in this
oral agreement although Mrs. Boelter testified that
Mrs. Blake was present and took part in the conversation.

* * * *
"The plaintiffs have fully performed their part of
the bargain. Mr. Blake signed the option. However,
Mrs. Blake, as one of the owners of the entireties, did
not sign the option and normally this failure on her part
would be a fatal defect in the option, bringing it under
the Statute of Frauds. Com. Laws 1929, Sec. 13413
(Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.908). It is a well-recognized
rule that part performance of a contract may take
it out of the statute. See Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 13415
(Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.910). The sole question here is
as to whether or not there has been such part performance as to permit a decree of specific performance
against her. We approve the decision of the trial
judge that there was such part performance.

* * * *
"Mrs. Blake had signed receipts for '$30.00 and
$10.00' as previously indicated. Obviously she knew all
the facts concerning the written option and by her
silence acquiesced in its being given without her signature. She knew of and made no objection to the repairs
and alterations made by the plaintiffs in their belief
that they were going to purchase the property. Mrs.
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Blake did not timely indicate to the plaintiffs her intention to consider the option void. She knew of and
acquiesced in the plan of monthly payments made for
the year, knowing that she and Mr. Blake owned the
property by the entireties.
"Careful consideration of this record as a whole
brings the conclusion that the equities are. all in favor
of plaintiffs, and that the contract was performed by the
plaintiffs with the knowledge of the defendants to the
extent equity requires plaintiffs be decreed specific
performance. In this jurisdiction there are many decisions to the effect that although oral agreements to
convey land are void under the statute of frauds above
cited, Comp. Laws 1929, Sec. 13413 (Stat. Ann. Sec.
26.908), yet under the related section of the statute,
Comp. Laws, 1929, Sec. 13415 (Stat. Ann. Sec. 26.910),
a court of equity has the power to grant specific performance of agreements of which there has been part
performance; and such relief should be granted when
as between the parties an equitable result will thereby
be accomplished."
It is fruitless to speculate in this action as to the amount
of money required "to make plaintiff whole." The very fact
that defendants are willing to pay a sum of money instead
of being bound by the contract indicates that they are aware
that the land has a value which is not compensable by the
sum of money they have offered. Moreover, when the doctrine
of equitable estoppel applies, the promisee acquires a property
right. The equity passes in the same way as though the
promisor had signed a written instrument.

In the language of Lord Chancellor Selborne in Maddison
v. Alderson, L.R. 8 App. Cas. 467:
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"In a suit founded on such performance, the defendant is really 'charged' upon the equities resulted from
the acts done in execution of the contract, and· not
(within the meaning of the statute) upon the contract
itself. If such equities were excluded, injustice of a
kind which the statute cannot be thought to have had in
contemplation would follow. * * * The matter has
advanced beyond the stage of contract; and the equities which arise out of the stage which it has reached
cannot be administered unless the contract is regarded. * * *"
As stated by the Court in Knauf & T. Co. v. Elkhart Lake
Sand & Gravel Co., 153· Wis. 306, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.) 744, 141
N. W. 701:
"The Statute of Frauds was not designed to enable
the evil-disposed to possess an instrumentality with
which to perpetrate fraud. It is the weapon of the
written law to prevent fraud, while the doctrine of
estoppel is that of the unwritten law to prevent like
evil. Each is effective in its appropriate field. Both
·are essential to prevent and redress wrongs."
The obtaining of valuable trackage is, of course, a valuable improvement upon real property, but this case does not
rest alone upon the doctrine of improvement within the meaning of the doctrine of part performance. As the annotator of
75 A.L.R. points out at Page 653:
"Such cases, and many others, such as the Vogel
case, are governed by the broader principles of estoppel,
rather than by the specific application thereof known
as the doctrine of part performance."
We submit that the principles applicable to this case are
modeled upon the fundamental theories of equity jurispru-
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dence. They are bottomed upon the approach to the law which
has always. been the particula~ pride of the chancellor. They
are founded upon the efforts of equity courts to prevent imposition upon persons as a result of the stern and sometimes
unyielding rules on the law side of the court.
It is submitted that the Trial Court in this case correctly
conceived the legal problem and correctly applied the law.
Harry Price is estopped to deny his affirmance and acceptance
of the obligations and terms of Exhibit E. He is bound in
equity to those terms to the same degree as though he affixed
his name to the contract.

·CONCLUSION
The fundamental problem here is whether the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is applicable to the facts as they were determined by the Trial Court. The principle was expressly adopted
by this Court in Bamberger Company v. Certified Productions,
Inc., et al., 88 Ut. 194, 48 Pac. (2d) 489, that in the language
of Mr. Justice Cardozo:
"We are facing a principle more nearly ultimate
than either waiver or estoppel, one with roots in the yet
larger principle that no one shall be permitted to found
any claim upon his own inequity or take advantage of
his own wrong. * * * The statute of frauds was not
intended to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental principle of justice."
In short, the respondent asks this Court to reaffirm the
principle "that he who by his language or conduct leads
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another to· do what he would not otherwise have done shall
not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted." Dickerson v. Colgrove,
100 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 618.
All of the argument in the brief submitted by appellants
and defendants is based upon facts as these defendants and
appellants would like to have had them determined by the
Trial Court instead of the factual determination as they were
made in the Findings of Fact. And yet not one single Finding
of Fact is directly controverted or contested in this proceeding.
There is absolutely no reason why the signatures of the two
women are not binding upon them, and why plaintiff should
not have specific performance of the contract as to their
interest in the land. The complaint in this case prayed for such
performance against all three defendants, resting the liability
of the defendant Harry Price squarely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
It is submitted that the Trial Court correctly conceived
the law and made correct and adequate Findings of Fact ·in
this case. Its decree should be affirmed. Moreover, the contract
provided for reasonable attorney's fees. It is submitted that
the affidavit filed with this brief as to the amount of reasonable
attorney's fee for handling of the case on appeal fairly apprises the Court of the value of respondent's attorneys. An
attorney's fee to respondent in the sum of $1000.00 . should
be awarded.
Respectfully submitted,
McKAY, BURTON, McMILLAN AND RICHARDS
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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